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ABSTARCT 
 
A denial of service attack (DOS) is any type of attack on a 
networking structure to disable a server from servicing its 
clients.  Attacks range from sending millions of requests to a 
server in an attempt to slow it down, flooding a server with 
large packets of invalid data, to sending requests with an invalid 
or spoofed IP address.  In this paper we show the 
implementation and analysis of three main types of attack: Ping 
of Death, TCP SYN Flood, and Distributed DOS.  The Ping of 
Death attack will be simulated against a Microsoft Windows 95 
computer.  The TCP SYN Flood attack will be simulated 
against a Microsoft Windows 2000 IIS FTP Server.  Distributed 
DOS will be demonstrated by simulating a distribution zombie 
program that will carry the Ping of Death attack.  This paper 
will demonstrate the potential damage from DOS attacks and 
analyze the ramifications of the damage. 
 
Keywords: Communications systems security, Denial of 
Service Attack (DOS), TCP SYN Flood, Ping of Death.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Denial of services attacks (DOS) is a constant danger to web 
sites.  DOS has received increased attention as it can lead to a 
severe lost of revenue if a site is taken offline for a substantial 
amount of time; see [1-4].  There are many types of denial of 
service attacks but two of the most common are Ping of Death 
and TCP SYN Flood.  We have chosen to implement these two 
techniques and add Distributed DOS (DDOS) as well.   
 
In a Ping of Death attack, a host sends hundreds of ping 
requests (ICMP Echo Requests) with a large or illegal packet 
size to another host in attempt to knock it offline or to keep it so 
busy responding with ICMP Echo replies that it cannot service 
its clients.   
 
A TCP SYN Flood attack takes advantage of the standard 
TCP three-way handshake by sending a request for connection 
with an invalid return address. 
 
In this paper we demonstrate DDOS by creating a worm like 
program that installs programs on remote machines to attack a 
particular server.  These attackers listen in the background for a 
message from a master program that will tell these attackers to 
launch a DOS attack against a machine.  
DDOS attacks are difficult to stop because they can be coming 
from anywhere in the world.  We will implement a DDOS 
attack by launching the Ping of Death implementation against a 
victim computer from several other workstations. 
II.  DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE WITH PING OF DEATH 
PAYLOAD IMPLEMENTATION 
 
To implement DDOS, a worm like program is created to 
simulate self-propagation onto many hosts on a network.  
However, creating an actual worm is beyond the scope of this 
paper, therefore, we used a small Java program to simulate such 
a worm.  Though it carries the payload and waits to receive 
orders from a master program, the worm does not self 
propagate.  We simply placed the application on each host 
machine manually for simulation purposes. 
 
The worm-like zombie program will launch a Ping of Death 
attack from multiple hosts coordinated by a master program.  
The applications handle all communication between each other.  
When the master program orders the attack, a message is sent to 
all the zombies that makes them release their Ping of Death 
payload against a victim host that is specified by the master 
program. 
 
The Java implementation has been built using TCP sockets 
and serializable Java objects.  Serializable Java objects can be 
transferred to remote servers and then executed with all of its 
information intact.  The serializable Java objects have all the 
instructions needed to launch a particular type of attack.  When 
a user wishes to initiate an attack, he or she starts up the master 
program and specifies which server to attack.  The master 
program then looks up the IP addresses of all known zombie 
programs and what ports they are listening on by accessing a 
configuration file. It then constructs a Java serializable object 
based on the DOS attack type specified, and sends it to every 
zombie listed in its configuration file over a TCP socket.  The 
zombie program recognizes that it has received a message and 
reads from a TCP socket the serializable java object.  It then 
deserializes it and executes it, which in turn will launch the 
DOS attack. Figures 1,2 show the scenario of this 
implementation. 
 
In figure 3, the DOSZombie class acts as a server that 
services DOS attacks.  It is created by specifying what port it 
should listen on.  It then creates a TCP socket and waits in the 
background until a communication message is received.  It is 
multithreaded; therefore, it can receive multiple connections at 
the same time.  
 
The DOSAttackLauncher class acts as the client and can 
communicate with a DOSZombie.  It is created by specifying 
the zombie’s IP address and the port that it is listening on.  The 
DOSAttackLauncher then creates a TCP connection to the 
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 zombie specified.  Its method, “launchAttack”, takes a 
DOSAttack object.  It will then send this object to the 
DOSZombie and the DOSZobmie will then invoke the 
DOSAttack’s attack method.  The DosZombie also sends a 
return message to the DOSAttackLauncher notifying if it 
successfully began the attack or if an error occurred. 
 
The DOSAttackManager is used by the master program that 
launches the attack.  It finds all the zombies that are running, 
constructs a DOSAttackLauncher for each zombie, and then 
instructs all DOSAttackLaunchers to send the type of 
DOSAttack to the zombie.  
The DOSAttacker class is an abstract class to support 
polymorphic behavior and implements the Java Serializable 
interface so that it can be sent through a TCP socket and 
executed on a remote server.   
 
The PingDOSAttacker and SYNFloodAttacker have the 
implementations for the “Ping of Death” attacker and the TCP 
SYN flood attack, respectively.  The PingDOSAttacker makes 
an external call to the C# Ping of Death implementation 
program when their attack methods are called.  
There are two Ping of Death implementations. The first and 
most simple implementation is simply by calling a ping 
application that comes with any modern network operating 
system.  The packet sizes are modified to be larger then the 
default 32 bytes.  The strength of this attack is not in the ping 
application itself by rather in the fact that when used in a DDOS 
scenario, the victim computer is simply overwhelmed by the 
large quantity of ICMP Echo Request packets. 
 
The second implementation uses a C# program and RAW 
Sockets to increase the amount and speed of the ECHO Request 
packets in addition to the size.  RAW Sockets are a form of TCP 
sockets that allow the programmer to build each packet from 
scratch.  The application therefore, must define all the 
parameters in the header as well as allocate all necessary buffers 
to contain the packet.  All checksums and validations have to be 
done by the application rather then handled by the operating 
system.  The advantage is speed: by removing checks and 
safeguards that the standard TCP socket has in place and 
allocating exact buffers, resource use is significantly reduced as 
a whole when considered in volume.  This also allows the 
application to do things like ignore ECHO Reply packets and 
concentrate solely on sending ECHO Request packets.  The 
implementation is extremely straightforward being small and 
concise, perfect for use in a covert DOS attack. 
 
The second implementation uses a C# program and RAW 
Sockets to increase the amount and speed of the ECHO Request 
packets in addition to the size.  RAW Sockets are a form of TCP 
sockets that allow the programmer to build each packet from 
scratch.  The application therefore, must define all the 
parameters in the header as well as allocate all necessary buffers 
to contain the packet.  All checksums and validations have to be 
done by the application rather then handled by the operating 
system.  The advantage is speed: by removing checks and 
safeguards that the standard TCP socket has in place and 
allocating exact buffers, resource use is significantly reduced as 
a whole when considered in volume.  This also allows the 
application to do things like ignore ECHO Reply packets and 
concentrate solely on sending ECHO Request packets.  The 
implementation is extremely straightforward being small and 
concise, perfect for use in a covert DOS attack. 
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Fig. 1. Communication Framework 
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Fig. 2. Overview of communication process. 
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Figure 3. Class Diagram of Java DDOS 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Data Flow Diagram 
 
III.  TCP SYN FLOOD IMPLEMENTATION 
 
When hosts need to establish communications via the TCP 
transport protocol, they must do a session initiation, which 
consists of a three-way handshake: 
 
1. The source host initiated the communication by sending a 
TCP packet to the destination host the SYN flag (SYNchronize 
sequence numbers) set to 1.  In this packet reside the source IP 
address and port number as well as the destination IP address 
and port numbers (in addition to several other fields which are 
inconsequential for this discussion). 
 
2. The destination host responds by sending a TCP packet to 
the source host with the flags SYN and ACK (ACKnowledge) 
set to 1.  The response is sent to the source IP address and port 
of the initial packet in step 1. 
 
3. The source host sends the destination host another TCP 
packet with the ACK flag set to 1.  This completes the 3-way 
handshake and normal data communication can start. 
 
In a TCP SYN Flood attack, the source (attacker) host 
simply fails to complete step 3 leaving the destination (victim) 
host with an unfinished communication session.  When the 
victim’s TCP socket receives the message in step one, it 
allocates buffers, increments counters, initiates timers, and 
increases communication stacks in preparation for the 
communication that is to follow.  In addition, processor time is 
spent building the reply packet (step 2) and sending it back.  
The attacker can overwhelm the victim’s computer resources by 
sending a “flood” of packets with the SYN flag set to 1 (step 1) 
and never bothering returning any response (step 3). 
 
The TCP SYN Flood attack implemented is the Neptune 
algorithm and implementation.  In this algorithm, not only is 
step 3 of the TCP handshake ignored, the source address in the 
SYN packet of step 1 is set to an unreachable destination (for 
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 example a non-routable IP address).  IP spoofing is used in this 
implementation therefore; it is virtually impossible to track the 
origin of the packet since the return address is fake.  The 
victim’s computer now expends time to try to deliver a packet to 
an inexistent destination. 
 
The Neptune implementation also allows the attacker to 
specify a specific service to deny.  In a classical TCP SYN 
Flood attack, the attacker generally tries to prevent the victim’s 
computer from servicing any legitimate requests.  The Neptune 
implementation however, allows the attacker to choose a 
specific TCP service port to overwhelm.  In other words, the 
attacker can choose to bring down only a web server for 
example (port 80). 
 
A simulation for an attack on a FTP server running 
Windows 2000 IIS FTP has been tested.  Figure 5 shows a 
small TCP SYN Flood attack against an FTP server (IP address 
148.166.161.115).  Notice that the source IP address is spoofed 
(part of the non-routable 10.x.x.x class B range).  In this 
particular attack, only three SYN flood packets were sent (Nos. 
1, 3, 5) against an FTP server (port 21 destination).  For each of 
the packets, the server replies with and ACK-SYN packet which 
in turn ends up nowhere (Nos. 2, 4, 6).  The server then retries 
to send replies a further two times before giving up (Nos. 7-12). 
 
When looking closer at the actual packets we can see the 
spoofed packet clearly with the SYN flag set to 1 (Figure 6) and 
the spoofed source IP address of 10.10.1.1.  Similarly, the 
return packet (Figure 7) is destined for nowhere and has the 
ACK and SYN flags set to 1.  The application also takes care of 
using different source port numbers and sequence numbers.  
This prevents the victim’s computer from assuming that packets 
all come from the same client in the same host.  By changing 
the return port and sequence numbers, a single computer can 
force another host to allocate several connection resources.   
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 8 shows an excerpt from the source code.  At this 
point, the TCP header is being built.  Notice the random source 
port, sequence number, and SYN flag set to one in the bolded 
sections. In this particular example three packets where sent, 
however, when a true flood of invalid packets are sent, it will 
overwhelm the computer and the more specifically the targeted 
service.  The packets are very small (since they contain no data) 
so that even a slow computer with a slow dial-up connection 
can overwhelm a server in a matter of seconds.  As the server 
spends time and resources trying to handle these fake 
connections, it starts to drop packets as it becomes 
overwhelmed, in doing so, it starts to also drop legitimate 
packets from legitimate users.  If such an attack were to be 
delivered via DDOS, the results could be devastating for a 
victim’s computer.  One simple computer can already 
overwhelm most TCP stacks; a distributed attack would most 
likely crash those stacks and the operating systems with them. 
 
The DDOS program is implemented in Java and can be used 
in virtually any operating environment that supports a Java JIT 
compiler making it cross-platform.  Since every operating 
system with a TCP socket support has a ping application, it 
would be easy enough to launch a Ping of Death attack from a 
wide range of hosts.  The only part missing is the self-
propagation piece of the zomebie worm.  The architecture is 
also open to allow it to deploy almost any attack via serializable 
objects.  This is to say, it could deliver any attack as its payload, 
even our TCP SYN Flood application that is written to take 
command line parameters as well.  The TCP SYN Flood 
application however, has the draw back of only working in a 
Linux environment.  It can be ported to a UNIX environment 
and with the advent of RAW sockets in Microsoft Windows 
2000/XP, it could also be ported over to the Windows world.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
All the implementations done in these simulations consist of 
very simple and light loaded attacks, which can cause severe 
amounts of damage.  DOS attacks can be stealthy covert and 
easily delivered.  The Neptune implementation for example, is 
only 10Kbytes in size and can cause devastation to a service.  
When combined with the power of a DDOS attack, Denial of 
Service is a truly powerful attack.  Although our 
implementations are not sophisticated, they serve as examples 
of what such programs can do and the damage they can cause. 
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Figure 5. TCP SYN Flood run against an FTP server 
 
 
Figure 6. SYN Flood packet with SYN flag set to 1 
 
 
Figure 7. Response packet with ACK-SYN flags set to 1 
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 /* IP address information */ 
    struct sockaddr_in sin;   
    register int i=0,j=0; 
 int floodcontrol=0; 
 unsigned short sport=161+getpid(); 
. . . 
     /* Build TCP header */ 
    packet.tcp.source=sport;   /* 16-bit Source port number */ 
    packet.tcp.dest=htons(dport);    /* 16-bit Destination port */ 
    packet.tcp.seq=49358353+getpid();  /* 32-bit Sequence Number */ 
    packet.tcp.ack_seq=0;   /* 32-bit Acknowledgement Number */ 
    packet.tcp.doff=5;    /* Data offset */ 
 packet.tcp.res1=0;    /* reserved */ 
    packet.tcp.urg=0;    /* Urgent offset valid flag */ 
    packet.tcp.ack=0;    /* ACK flag */ 
    packet.tcp.psh=0;    /* Push flag */ 
    packet.tcp.rst=0;    /* Reset flag */ 
    packet.tcp.syn=1;    /* SYN flag */ 
    packet.tcp.fin=0;    /* Finish sending flag */ 
    packet.tcp.window=htons(242);   /* 16-bit Window size */ 
    packet.tcp.check=0;   /* 16-bit checksum (to be filled in below) */ 
    packet.tcp.urg_ptr=0;   /* 16-bit urgent offset */ 
     /* Build IP header */ 
    packet.ip.version=4;   /* 4-bit Version */ 
 packet.ip.ihl=5;    /* 4-bit Header Length */ 
    packet.ip.tos=0;    /* 8-bit Type of service */ 
    packet.ip.tot_len=htons(40);   /* 16-bit Total length */ 
    packet.ip.id=getpid();   /* 16-bit ID field */ 
    packet.ip.frag_off=0;   /* 13-bit Fragment offset */ 
    packet.ip.ttl=255;    /* 8-bit Time To Live */ 
    packet.ip.protocol=IPPROTO_TCP;   /* 8-bit Protocol */ 
    packet.ip.check=0;    /* 16-bit Header checksum (filled in below) */ 
    packet.ip.saddr=sadd;   /* 32-bit Source Address */ 
    packet.ip.daddr=dadd;  /* 32-bit Destination Address */ 
 
Figure 8. Excerpt from the source code 
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